Doing philosophy is a skill that everyone can learn, given the right context. I aim to establish that context by creating a respectful and reciprocal discussion culture. I collect student questions to create a bottom-up structure for each session, aim to impart critical thinking skills, and integrate a research perspective by reading current texts or inviting guest lecturers. All courses can be taught in English or German. Please contact me for syllabi.
Undergraduate Seminars
1. Introduction to Philosophy (various topics)
The course introduces students to main tools of philosophical thinking, such as critical thinking, systematic reading of text, reconstruction of arguments, philosophical discussion, how to cite correctly, and how to write and essay. Students are taught these skills in dedicated session, while also practicing them by participating in a regular seminar, where they read texts, write assignments and learn debate and critical thinking.
2. Philosophical Writing (various topics)
The course teaches students how to write a term paper. The first part of the course consists of reading three texts which each formulate a contrasting position about a philosophical topic (e.g. whether the mind is extended or in the brain). In the second part, students write an introduction and two drafts of an essay (1000-2000 words), with feedback on each of their versions. By the end of the term, they have completed a graded term paper.
3. Introduction to Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of science asks fundamental questions about the nature of science, when science succeeds (e.g. in generating knowledge) and what role scientific findings play in society. The course introduces students to basic topics (rather than authors), such as: induction and confirmation, causation, laws of nature, explanation, prediction, change and progress, objectivity and values, experimentation in physical and social sciences, scientific modeling, science in society (e.g. gender in reproductive biology, race in medicine).
4. The empirical study of the mindThe seminar discusses how cognitive processes (e.g. perception, memory, attention) and consciousness can be empirically investigated. We examine how philosophical assumptions about the mind shape empirical research. Are only brain processes relevant to the study of the mind, or must the body and environment also be included? Is the mind similar to a computer that processes information and performs calculations, or do we need other terms to adequately describe cognitive processes? Are mechanisms only cognitive if they represent something in the world, or can dynamic systems also exhibit intelligent behavior without representing anything? We also ask whether psychology and neuroscience provide information about different types of consciousness. Do these findings only concern the conscious access to information or do we also learn something about the qualitative character of conscious experience?
5. Experiment and Decomposition in the Life Sciences
Decomposition refers to the strategy of understanding a whole through the interaction of its parts. Biology explains the function of the heart to pump blood as a result contracting heart chambers; neuroscience explains the electrical behavior of neurons through interacting ion channels, and psychology divides cognitive functions such as memory into short-term or long-term memory etc.. Life scientists use decomposition in experiments, e.g. when measuring and manipulating parts of organisms (e.g. genes or cells). The seminar discusses what decomposition is, analyzes its role in scientific practice, when it succeeds or fails, and how it relates to topics like reductive explanation, or the discovery of mechanisms.
6. Science and democracy
The relationship between science and democracy is complex. On the one hand, it is unclear whether science is inherently democratic because, after all, results or theories are not voted on by ballot. On the other hand, scientific education promotes the ability to think critically, which is of great importance for the continued existence of democratic societies. However, the coronavirus pandemic is not the first to show that the role of scientific experts in politics can also lead to democratic deficits. Already in the 1970s, philosopher Paul Feyerabend demanded that truth-finding should be carried out by a body of citizens and not by an expert elite. The seminar discusses whether science needs democracy and, conversely, what role scientific experts play or should play in political decisions, and how we can protect ourselves against the political polarization of science.
7. Technology in Science and Society
Technology is omnipresent in our everyday lives. From smartphones and GPS to conventional clinical thermometers - many technical developments would be inconceivable without scientific research. At the same time technical tools from microscopes to particle accelerator plays an indispensable role in the advancement of scientific knowledge. The seminar approaches the interplay between science, technology and society using texts from a philosophy of science viewpoint. We discuss whether technical innovation is a genuine goal of the natural sciences and what influence non-scientific institutions such as the military or the pharmaceutical industry have on science-driven technological development.
8. Climate science and climate crisis
“I want you to panic like the house is on fire!” With these words, climate activist Greta Thunberg calls on politicians to finally do something about the climate crisis. She brings the figure 413ppm into play, which describes the number of CO2 molecules in the atmosphere. But how exactly is this figure calculated? And at what level does the climate threaten to change irreversibly, with fatal consequences for humans and the environment? And what must we do as a society and as individuals to stop further emissions of climate-damaging gases? The seminar discuss these other scientific, philosophical and social questions about climate research and the climate crisis.
9. Science and responsibility
Do scientists have a responsibility towards society? Are scientists responsible for what their research results are used for? Should some types of research be banned because they lead to negative social consequences (such as war or discrimination)? The seminar discusses these questions with regard to research on, e.g. nuclear technology, viruses, artificial intelligence and neuroscience.
10. Interpretations Everywhere? On the Relation between the Sciences and the Humanities
The humanities are often accused of basing their theories merely on subjective interpretations of texts, whereas scientific findings are based on objectively valid data obtained through controlled experiments. Some authors infer from this that humanities are epistemically inferior to the methods of modern science. On closer inspection, however, natural scientists also have to interpret their data with the help of models and background assumptions in order to formulate theories, and humanities scholars also often use scientific findings to support their theories. So what exactly is the difference between the theories and methods of the humanities and the natural sciences?
11. Holism in Language, Mind and Science
Holism is the idea that the parts of a system can only be understood in relation to other parts and the system as a whole. The seminar discusses three theory clusters of holism: semantic holism claims that the meaning of individual words is dependent on the meaning of other words in a language. For example, the meaning of “tree” is dependent on the meaning of “plant”, which in turn is dependent on the meaning of “organism” and so on. Confirmation holism claims on the one hand that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation, as it depends on other hypotheses of a scientific theory. Belief holism claims that every belief, if it has conceptual content, depends on other beliefs. The seminar discusses the foundations of these theories and their relationship to each other.
Graduate Seminars
12. Normative Theories of Conceptual Change in Science and Society
Concepts are crucial tools to gain access and act upon phenomena in the natural and the social world. Researchers introduce, extend and revise terms like “gene” or “climate change” to understand heredity or global warming, while policymakers and activists use them to fight the climate crisis or social injustice. But when is changing a concept to pursue epistemic, practical or sociopolitical goals justified? What distinguishes successful from failed conceptual change? When should concept be extended or eliminated from discourse? Normative theories of conceptual change aim to answer these questions. While theories from philosophy of science focus on the epistemic dimension of conceptual change, theories of conceptual engineering also include social and political dimensions of changing terms like “race” or “gender”. The seminar discusses theories from both fields.
13. Theories of the Brain: From Freud to Friston
Neuroscience is often described as “data-rich and theory-poor”. Formal systems with axioms and laws of nature play a less prominent role in brain research than in physics. However, the orientation towards theories of physics overlooks that neuroscientists also search for conceptual frameworks and organizing principles that cover many observations and phenomena. The seminar discusses historical and current theories of the brain and analyze their epistemic status. Theories include Freud's neuroanatomical justification of the psychoanalytic theory of mind, Gerald Edelman's Neural Darwinism, hierarchical models of the visual system and Karl Friston's Bayesian theory of the brain (Free Energy Principle and Predictive Coding). Readings consist of primary sources and philosophical commentaries on each theory.
14. Discovery, Justification and Pursuit in Science
Scientific discovery is both the process and the outcome of scientific inquiry. Scientific inquiry may focus, e.g., on hypotheses to be generated or tested, causes to be identified, or processes, things, and their features to be uncovered. Starting with logical empiricism, philosophers of science distinguished between a “context of discovery” – where new ideas and hypotheses are generated – and a “context of justification” – where those ideas and hypotheses are verified or falsified. Recent accounts of scientific inquiry, however, question whether the contexts of discovery and justification can actually be sharply distinguished. They also emphasize that exploratory research, the development of new tools, and incidental findings, and plays an important role in discovery, and that scientific inquiry has a third aspect: pursuit, viz. the articulation and validation of theories and research tools. But how exactly should scientific pursuit be characterized? What is its precise relation to discovery and justification? And how does a closer look at pursuit help us get a better understanding of scientific inquiry and explanation?
15. “Race” and Racism in Science and Philosophy
Racism and the fight against it pervades society, as attested by “Black Lives Matter” protests in the US, or protests against racist migration policy plans of the AfD party in Germany. The current structures of racist discrimination result from historical processes such as colonialism, enslavement, nationalism and their inhuman consequences. Science and philosophy play an ambivalent role in this context: scientists have both attempted to legitimize the concept of ‘race’ and criticised any division of humans into ‘races’ as completely unscientific. Important philosophers such as Kant or Hegel also made racist statements, while thinkers like Michael Hardimon or Kimberlé Crenshaw critically analyse the term ‘race’ and advance anti-racist theory. The seminar discusses questions such as: Does the term ‘race’ refer to a biological reality, a social construct, or to nothing at all? Does the term ‘race’ have any scientific value or is its scientific use always racist? How should we deal with racist statements in classical philosophical texts? What meaning of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ is important to support anti-racist theory and activism?
16. Concepts and Conceptual Analysis: new approaches in philosophy of language, science and experimental philosophy
The analysis of concepts is a central working method of (analytic) philosophy. Classically, it aims to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the analysed concept, which is tested against real or hypothetical cases (e.g. testing analyses of "knowledge" against Gettier cases). The seminar discusses three current strands that critically examines and moves beyond the classical ideas. Experimental philosophers questions the reliability of cases to test conceptual analysis. Second, philosophers of science claim that scientific terms do not have a fixed and uniform definition, but change over time and often consist of a patchwork of local applications. Thirdly, philosophers of language propose to replace conceptual analysis with conceptual engineering, i.e. the assessment and improvement of concepts such as "gender" or "race" for scientific or political purposes.
17. Philosophy of Psychedelics
In the last two decades, so-called psychedelic substances have gained renewed interest in neuroscience, psychiatry and philosophy. Neuroscientists have investigated the neurobiological mechanisms that underlie the altered states of perception, emotion and consciousness that are caused by psychedelic substances. Psychiatrists have again started to investigate the therapeutic potential of incorporating psychedelics into the treatment of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and dealing with terminal illness. Philosophers have analyzed these novel empirical findings to ask what altered states of consciousness can tell us about the nature of the mind, self, and knowledge. The seminar uses texts from each of these areas to analyze and critically evaluate our empirical and theoretical understanding of psychedelics, and the epistemic basis for their therapeutic potential.
18. Brain Doping, Genetic Corn, Mass Extinction and Pandemics: Societal Issues in the Life Sciences
The rapid advances of life sciences has reshaped our ability to manipulate and control organisms. Life scientists often argue that innovations like gene-editing or memory-enhancers can radically disrupt society. Bio- and neuroethicists consequently debate whether we should label genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or whether “brain doping” provides students with unfair advantages. Do these issues have a scientific basis or do they only reflect the hype surrounding these innovations? The seminar uses scientific and philosophical texts to distinguish reality from hype in the case of GMOs, neuroenhancement, the sixth mass extinction on earth and the polarization surrounding COVID vaccines.